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Secret Papers Put in Record

Washington, May 11 (AP) — The secret Nixon administration Vietnam policy papers that Sen. Mike Gravel (D-Alaska) has been blocked for more than two weeks from putting on the public record were quietly inserted in the Congressional Record today by Rep. Ronald V. Dellums (D-Calif.).

"Gravel gave me the papers, asked me to put them in the Record, and I agreed to do it because I think the American people have the right to know the basis on which the President's reckless decisions are being made," Dellums said.

He inserted in the Record without objections from any House member 239 pages of the memoranda. The material, sometimes referred to as the Kissinger papers for President Nixon's national security adviser Henry Kissinger, tells of opposing Pentagon and civilian agencies' recommendations on Vietnam war policy in 1969.

All of the memoranda appearing in the Congressional Record had already been disclosed in news media across the country.

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The Die Is Cast, but Possibility of Talk Remains

By TED LEWIS

Washington, May 11—We are now committed as a nation to seeking an end to the Vietnam war by halting the flow of supplies to North Vietnam from Soviet Russia and Red China. Whatever the risks in this enterprise, the American people must accept them, for the gamble has been taken by an administration they elected and entrusted their security to.

It follows that on this one issue, now that it has been joined, there is no pulling back. We have a *fait accompli*. The harbors have live mines. What responses come from Peking and Moscow must be based on the fact that the deed is done.

So it is futile to raise voices, either in protest or in support, for there are going to be no changes made in this Nixon effort "to end the war" in this fashion. Having said that, in connection with the all-out naval and air action to deprive Hanoi of military supplies, there are two aspects of Nixon Vietnam policy, both tangential to the decision to expand the war, that cannot come under the national unity motif no matter how much the administration tries to include them.

What is past is prologue. And there is no question, despite Nixon's obtuse evasiveness on the issue, that Vietnamization as he had planned it failed significantly to come up to expectations. If it had the South Vietnamese would have been able "to hack it," as Gen. Abrams put it, and beaten off North Vietnamese ground onslaughts.

And neither is there any question, despite the fuzzy denial by Defense Secretary Laird, that our intelligence apparatus misread all signals from North Vietnam. The offensive power of Hanoi was totally underestimated, including its tank, artillery and anti-aircraft strength.

Nixon's Offer to Hanoi

Sure, this is all water over the dam, but it is relevant. Had the Communist invasion been checked, there obviously would have been no necessity for the U.S. to carry the war by sea and air to the north, with the attendant risk

night announcement of his harbor mining and rail interdiction decision. He offered a "ceasefire throughout Indochina" to accompany American military disengagement from the war on release of American PWs.

This ceasefire proposal was supposed to be a most generous offer. But to this date, its terms have been shrouded in deliberate ambiguity. Clearly it was unacceptable to Hanoi if it required the withdrawal of all North Vietnamese troops from South Vietnam. For that reason there have been hints here that the offer could be a ceasefire based on

the present ground positions of the bulk of the invading forces.

What goes on in this juggling of semantics is almost beyond comprehension. But something is in the wind and it definitely does not jibe with the tough anti-invasion language delivered by Nixon and Laird among others previously.

Any negotiations with Hanoi were supposed to be out until North Vietnam withdrew all the forces that launched the "massive invasion" of March 30 across the demilitarized zone.

Currency for a Rumor

A ceasefire leaving the Hanoi Reds in strategic positions they now hold within South Vietnam could scarcely contribute to the cause of an honorable peace as envisioned by Nixon. Yet for some unfathomable reason the administration—including presidential adviser Henry Kissinger—have allowed this possibility to be bandied about by de-emphasizing as a must the withdrawal of all Communist troops from South Vietnam.

We bring up these points of controversy because they involve issues of policy separate from the military effort to halt the flow of war materiel into North Vietnam. There is a strained effort in the administration to silence critics of these aspects as well as critics of the expanded U.S. air and naval involvement.

Bragged of Vietnamization

We have, for example, Treasury Secretary Connally accusing Senate Democrats of "placing partisan politics above the interests of this nation." And Defense Secretary Laird saying, "This is no time for quitters or for a lot of talk about instant surrender." He said

he was convinced the American people "support Gen. Abrams and our men in opposing Communist aggression."

Abrams is the general who time and again, with an echo from Nixon, said Vietnamization was a success and the troops of South Vietnam were capable, on the ground, of keeping their country safe from Red aggression.

That issue in itself cannot be eliminated. It is the only issue of presidential



UPI photo

The Newport News—heavy cruiser on duty near Haiphong.

Nixon's 1968 pledge to end the war, for he "had a plan" that would do just that nor the horrific mess in our intelligence setup, including the CIA with its ignorance of the vast Soviet-supplied arsenal of offensive weapons available for the invasion.

Whether this war will be won, lost or compromised is still up in the air despite all the flamboyant rhetoric. Which way it is going to go for the next few months will not depend on how bellicose the Soviet statements are to the U.S. crackdown on Red shipping, but on what the North Vietnam invading divisions do before Hue, An Loc and Kontum.

CAPITOL STUFF

to Nixon's "generation of peace" gestures to Peking and Moscow.

But there is another tangential aspect to the carrying of the war to North Vietnam that is far more pertinent and even more perplexing.

That issue in itself cannot be eliminated. It is the only issue of presidential

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Fast, Vital Decision Forced on Hanoi

By ORR KELLY
Star Staff Writer

The American effort to seal off North Vietnam from the rest of the world has forced leaders in Hanoi to make a critical decision almost immediately on the future course of the war, in the view of top administration officials.

The North Vietnamese must either decide to call off their offensive in the South or take the chance that almost all of their army might become stranded without fuel, ammunition or even food, according to this analysis.

Although the renewed enemy attack in An Loc yesterday, with 7,000 artillery shells fired, could be a sign that the North Vietnamese have decided to go for broke, the area being watched most closely is near the northern border.

If the North Vietnamese 304th, 308th and, possibly, 325-C divisions renew the attack in an attempt to take the city of Hue, it will be a clear signal that the leaders in Hanoi have decided to take the heavy risks involved in continuing their military effort in the South.

May Find Alternatives

Pentagon experts on Vietnam have no doubt that the North Vietnamese, who have proved extraordinarily resourceful in the past, can find ways to obtain the supplies they need and move them South. This was the prediction made to President Nixon by the Central Intelligence Agency shortly after he assumed office.

But the administration reasoning is that any effort to adapt to the new circumstances will take time and might well involve not only the development of new supply routes but adoption of a much different strategy for fighting the war.

The efforts to develop a new supply system to get around the American air and sea attacks would have to involve different ways of receiving supplies from other countries as well as new methods of moving supplies within North Vietnam.

During the U.S. bombing

campaign of 1965-68, supply routes were shifted so that much of the foreign war materiel came down by rail and road from China. In some cases ships that normally would have used the port of Haiphong unloaded their supplies in southern China and the goods were then moved by land.

U.S. planes are now making heavy attacks on the two rail lines that connect Hanoi with China and on the supply routes that lead south toward the battle front. In the past the North Vietnamese have proved extremely able in replacing bombed-out roads and bridges or building multiple bypasses. In some cases bridges have been built underwater to make them difficult to find and destroy.

Administration officials are very reluctant to make any guesses about how long the North Vietnamese might keep on fighting with the supplies they have on hand. This all depends, they say, on how intense the fighting is and, especially, on the rate they use up critical supplies like fuel and lubricants.

While the attempt to isolate North Vietnam may neither end nor win the war, administration officials are hopeful that it will permit the final withdrawal of American forces and leave the present Saigon government relatively intact, at least for the time being.

Kissinger's Views

Both Henry A. Kissinger, White House adviser on national security affairs, and Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird, emphasized the importance of the decision that must be made in Hanoi in talking to reporters this week.

Kissinger, asked during a press conference Tuesday how long the North Vietnamese could keep up their current offensive, said decisions must be made before the supplies run out.

"It is unlikely that anybody would run down his supplies to the zero level before he made another decision," Kissinger said. "Now, at what point that decision has to be made, it is

difficult to predict. We do not believe that anything that was done will affect the battle that may now be taking place in the next three weeks. It could affect and should affect the next round."

Enemy Must Decide

Laird, asked a similar question at a press conference on Wednesday, said:

"The effect upon the battle area will be whether or not the enemy makes the decision to continue an all-out effort and go to zero as far as their supplies are concerned or whether they feel that because of the interdiction or the stoppage of supplies that they can anticipate in the future, this will have an effect upon the level of battle in the particular area."

"... I am not prepared to read those intentions, whether they are willing to go for broke in four or five weeks or whether they are willing to use their supplies in a much more measured manner depending upon the success or failure as they see it of the supply movement and the logistics movement into North Vietnam."

While the North Vietnamese leaders have managed to maintain a very high degree of security about their decision making, there obviously has long been a struggle within the leadership over whether to fight a long, protracted guerrilla-type struggle, to carry on a major conventional offensive, like that now under way or to concentrate on efforts to build up the North Vietnamese economy.

American experts assume that the mining of the nation's harbors, the shelling of its shores and the renewed bombing have all served to intensify this internal debate.

Pentagon Press Spokesman Jerry W. Friedheim said today that no apparent attempt had been made by any of the 31 foreign ships remaining in Haiphong harbor to run the minefield. Five ships left in the last few hours before the mines became active yesterday morning.

"Cooling It" Indicated

So far, he said, the three American destroyers and the South Vietnamese destroyer-escort which have established a picket line across the Tonkin Gulf have not had to notify any ships of the presence of the mines. This would indicate that the 12 Russian and 13 ships of other countries believed headed toward Haiphong have received orders to "cool it" until the situation is clarified.

Friedheim said he saw no special significance in a report from Tokyo by the Associated Press that a Soviet cruiser and a missile-carrying destroyer had been seen sailing south through the Tsushima Strait between Japan and Korea. He said movements of Soviet vessels in those waters are not unusual.

The report was attributed to the Japanese Defense Agency. A spokesman for the agency told the AP the ships were traveling at only about 10 knots, and the cruiser's maximum speed is 34 knots.